
handle: 10419/102113 , 11565/3990755
This paper explores the sale of an object to an ambiguity averse buyer. We show that the seller can increase his profit by using an ambiguous mechanism. That is, the seller can benefit from hiding certain features of the mechanism that he has committed to from the agent. We then characterize the profit maximizing mechanisms for the seller and characterize the conditions under which the seller can gain by employing an ambiguous mechanism.
ambiguity aversion, ddc:330, optimal mechanism design, individual rationality, C72, D82, incentive compatibility, OPTIMAL MECHANISM DESIGN, AMBIGUITY AVERSION, INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY, INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY, optimal mechanism design, ambiguity aversion, incentive compatibility, individual rationality, D44, jel: jel:C72, jel: jel:D82, jel: jel:D44
ambiguity aversion, ddc:330, optimal mechanism design, individual rationality, C72, D82, incentive compatibility, OPTIMAL MECHANISM DESIGN, AMBIGUITY AVERSION, INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY, INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY, optimal mechanism design, ambiguity aversion, incentive compatibility, individual rationality, D44, jel: jel:C72, jel: jel:D82, jel: jel:D44
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| influence This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | Top 10% | |
| impulse This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network. | Top 10% |
