
School districts and other institutions allocating objects without the use of transfers tend to rely on mechanisms that only elicit agents’ ordinal preferences. The present note shows that the welfare loss imposed by only eliciting ordinal preferences can be arbitrarily large.
10007 Department of Economics, 330 Economics
10007 Department of Economics, 330 Economics
| selected citations These citations are derived from selected sources. This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | 12 | |
| popularity This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network. | Average | |
| influence This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | Top 10% | |
| impulse This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network. | Top 10% |
