Kuhn's Theorem for Extensive Form Ellsberg Games

descriptionPublicationkeyboard_double_arrow_right Article , Other literature type , Research 01 Jan 2014 Germany English Publisher:Elsevier BVJournal:SSRN Electronic Journal (eissn: 1556-5068,

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Authors: Muraviev, Igor; Riedel, Frank; Sass, Linda;

doi: 10.2139/ssrn.2458913 , 10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.11.004

handle: 10419/103928

Kuhn's Theorem for Extensive Form Ellsberg Games

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Abstract

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Country

Germany

Related Organizations

University of Johannesburg
South Africa
Bielefeld University
Germany

Keywords

Kuhn's theorem, ddc:330, Strategic ambiguity, Maxmin utility, strategic ambiguity, Decision theory, 510, D81, Strategic Ambiguity, C72, Ellsberg Games, Ellsberg games, Kuhn's Theorem, Games in extensive form, maxmin utility, Maxmin Utility

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