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Economics of information, dynamic moral hazard, Multistage and repeated games, Signaling and communication in game theory, endogenous effort, dynamic signaling, Dynamic Signaling, Dynamic Moral Hazard, Endogenous Effort, jel: jel:D82, jel: jel:D83, jel: jel:C73, jel: jel:J24
Economics of information, dynamic moral hazard, Multistage and repeated games, Signaling and communication in game theory, endogenous effort, dynamic signaling, Dynamic Signaling, Dynamic Moral Hazard, Endogenous Effort, jel: jel:D82, jel: jel:D83, jel: jel:C73, jel: jel:J24
| selected citations These citations are derived from selected sources. This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | 14 | |
| popularity This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network. | Top 10% | |
| influence This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | Top 10% | |
| impulse This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network. | Top 10% |
