Household Consumption When the Marriage is Stable
Copyright policy )Household Consumption When the Marriage is Stable
We develop a novel framework to analyze the structural implications of the marriage market for household consumption. We define a revealed preference characterization of efficient household consumption when the marriage is stable. We characterize stable marriage with intrahousehold (consumption) transfers but without assuming transferable utility. Our revealed preference characterization generates testable conditions even with a single observation per household and heterogeneous individual preferences across households. The characterization also allows for identifying the intrahousehold decision structure (including the sharing rule) under the same minimalistic assumptions. An application to Dutch household data illustrates the usefulness of our theoretical results. (JEL D60, D63, H21, H23, I38)
- Maastricht University Netherlands
- Institute for the Study of Labor Germany
- Erasmus Research Institute of Management
- Katholieke Universiteit Leuven Belgium
- Université Libre de Bruxelles Belgium
Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods, stable matching, DEMAND, marriage market, preference heterogeneity, GENERAL CHARACTERIZATION, marriage market; stable matching; Pareto efficient household consumption; testable implications; sharing rule identification; preference heterogeneity, Bargaining Theory, C14, Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory, NONPARAMETRIC BOUNDS, D11, C78, EFFICIENT INTRAHOUSEHOLD ALLOCATIONS, COLLECTIVE MODEL, marriage market, stable matching, Pareto efficient household consumption, testable implications, sharing rule identification, preference heterogeneity, IDENTIFICATION, ddc:330, Matching Theory, Consumer Economics: Theory, Pareto efficient household consumption, EMPIRICAL TESTS, MARKET, GROUP-BEHAVIOR, testable implications, sharing rule identification, Economie, REVEALED PREFERENCE THEORY, jel: jel:D11, jel: jel:C78, jel: jel:C14
Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods, stable matching, DEMAND, marriage market, preference heterogeneity, GENERAL CHARACTERIZATION, marriage market; stable matching; Pareto efficient household consumption; testable implications; sharing rule identification; preference heterogeneity, Bargaining Theory, C14, Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory, NONPARAMETRIC BOUNDS, D11, C78, EFFICIENT INTRAHOUSEHOLD ALLOCATIONS, COLLECTIVE MODEL, marriage market, stable matching, Pareto efficient household consumption, testable implications, sharing rule identification, preference heterogeneity, IDENTIFICATION, ddc:330, Matching Theory, Consumer Economics: Theory, Pareto efficient household consumption, EMPIRICAL TESTS, MARKET, GROUP-BEHAVIOR, testable implications, sharing rule identification, Economie, REVEALED PREFERENCE THEORY, jel: jel:D11, jel: jel:C78, jel: jel:C14
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