
doi: 10.2139/ssrn.2362789
The administrative enforcement of competition law increasingly relies on new, informal instruments. These instruments are deemed to be more effective or efficient, but they might give rise to concerns regarding the safeguard function of the law. This working paper illustrates the problems with alternative enforcement by focusing on settlements in the Netherlands, the UK and France. It also illustrates the approach to the author's thesis, which is forthcoming in 2016.
Informal enforcement, Competition law, Alternative enforcement, Settlements, Enforcement
Informal enforcement, Competition law, Alternative enforcement, Settlements, Enforcement
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