Optimal Stopping with Private Information

descriptionPublicationkeyboard_double_arrow_right Article , Other literature type 01 Jan 2013 United States English Publisher:Elsevier BVJournal:SSRN Electronic Journal (eissn: 1556-5068,

Copyright policy )Funded by:DFG | unidentified

Authors: Thomas Kruse; Philipp Strack;

doi: 10.2139/ssrn.2291937 , 10.1016/j.jet.2015.03.001

Optimal Stopping with Private Information

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Abstract

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Country

United States

Related Organizations

Justus Liebig University Giessen
Germany
Yale University
United States
University of California
United States
University of California, Berkeley
United States
University of Évry Val d'Essonne
France

Keywords

Stopping times; optimal stopping problems; gambling theory, posted-price mechanism, Dynamic mechanism design, Dynamic implementability, Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models, Dynamic Implementability, Posted-Price Mechanism, dynamic mechanism design, optimal stopping, Posted-price mechanism, Optimal stopping, Dynamic Mechanism Design, Optimal Stopping, Economic Theory, Other Economics, dynamic implementability

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	influence This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically).	Top 10%
	impulse This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network.	Top 10%