
doi: 10.2139/ssrn.2289992
handle: 10419/81108
The London InterBank Offered Rate (LIBOR) is the most important set of interest rate benchmarks. Recently there have been reports about systematic manipulation of the LIBOR. We thus investigate incentives and possibilities to rig the LIBOR or related statistics for quote submitting panel banks. Both reputation concerns and financial exposure to the index may lead to misrepresentation of borrowing costs. Even in the static model we consider, we show that incorrect quoting is the standard and honesty the exception. In particular, we can theoretically explain why the LIBOR quotes were too low during the financial crisis which started in 2007, when increasing panel bank sizes is helpful and why individual quotes should be published with delay. Moreover, we evaluate and compare the performance of different aggregators like the median, the trimmed average and the average.
Ökonomischer Anreiz, Spieltheorie, 330, ddc:330, Bank, Welt, Manipulation, Informationsverhalten, Interbankenmarkt
Ökonomischer Anreiz, Spieltheorie, 330, ddc:330, Bank, Welt, Manipulation, Informationsverhalten, Interbankenmarkt
| selected citations These citations are derived from selected sources. This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | 5 | |
| popularity This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network. | Average | |
| influence This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | Average | |
| impulse This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network. | Average |
