Auctions and Corruption

descriptionPublicationkeyboard_double_arrow_right Article , Research , Book , Preprint 01 Jan 2000 Germany English Publisher:Elsevier BVJournal:SSRN Electronic Journal (eissn: 1556-5068,

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Authors: Yvan Lengwiler; Elmar G. Wolfstetter;

doi: 10.2139/ssrn.228904

handle: 10419/62255 , 10419/75726

Auctions and Corruption

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Abstract

In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we propose a model of corruption, examine how corruption affects the auction game, how the anticipation of corruption affects bidding, and how it altogether changes the revenue ranking of typical auctions. In addition we characterize incentive schemes that may prevent corruption, and compare them to the fee schedules employed by major auction houses.

Country

Germany

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Keywords

auctions,procurement,corruption,collusion,coalitions, Auctions, ddc:330, 330 Wirtschaft, corruption, collusion, coalitions, Auctions, procurement, corruption, collusion, coalitions, auctions, procurement, D44, jel: jel:D44

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