Privatization Under Asymmetric Information

descriptionPublicationkeyboard_double_arrow_right Article , Research , Preprint 01 Jan 2000 English Publisher:Elsevier BVJournal:SSRN Electronic Journal (eissn: 1556-5068,

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Authors: Dieter Bös;

doi: 10.2139/ssrn.224140

handle: 10419/75646

Privatization Under Asymmetric Information

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Abstract

This paper models privatization as a cooperative game between the government, a trade union and the private shareholders. These players kno w that privatization increases the efficiency of a firm, but only the management of the firm knows the exact value of the relevant productivity-increasing parameter. This incomplete information changes many of the results which were attained in Bös (1991) in a full-information setting.

Keywords

ddc:330, asymmetric information, Privatization, asymmetric information, Privatization

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