This paper analyses politically connected firms in Italy, since 1987 to 2006. We take into consideration this nation because in Italy political connections are supposed to have been more valuable and relevant than in other countries. We focus our attention on listed industrial and holding corporations, leaving out consideration banks and insurance companies. We try to develop two main questions: which listed industrial and holding corporations have been politically connected in this period? Have these firms been politically connected through officers or large shareholders, President of the Republic, members of Parliament or ministers? Which is the value of political connections and which are the differences between politically connected and non connected firms? This study tries to highlight the features and the sizes of the political connection in the Italian context, giving evidence of the economic, political and institutional framework. According to the existing literature we argue that firms with political connections gain financial benefits in terms of greater market power, but show poorer performances and efficiency than non connected firms because of the relevant private benefits that characterize the politically connected ones.