
This paper examines inventory management from an incentive perspective. We show that when a manager has private information about future attainable revenues, the residual income performance measure based on historical cost can achieve optimal (second-best) incentives with regard to managerial effort as well as production and sales decisions. The LIFO (last-in–first-out) inventory flow rule is shown to be preferable to the FIFO (first-in–first-out) rule for the purpose of aligning incentives. Our analysis also finds support for the lower-of-cost-or-market inventory-valuation rule in situations where the manager receives new information after the initial contracting stage.
330, inventory management, historical cost accounting, decentralization, agency theory
330, inventory management, historical cost accounting, decentralization, agency theory
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