An analysis of the democratic peace theory in the context of the events of the past decade is limited in the literature and this paper aims to fill this gap by summarizing and examining the validity of each of the arguments. Based on the events from 2001 to 2011, the main components of the democratic peace theory — that democratic dyads rarely go to war with each other but, nevertheless, democracies are as war-prone as autocracies — remain valid although the causal mechanisms that uphold the contention that democracies usually win the wars they fight are still a point of debate. In the Iraq war case (2003), the selection effects show that autocratic leaders face grave consequences, such as being executed, if they lose a war, which makes them more careful about choosing the wars they fight. In contrast, democratic leaders merely suffer from negative electoral consequences if the outcome of a war is unfavorable. Lastly, I conclude that military effectiveness based on cultural explanation/individual soldiering could be more advantageous for the soldiers following a religious doctrine as exhibited by the Taliban’s use of the concept of jihad.