
doi: 10.2139/ssrn.217748
handle: 10419/20909
This paper discusses the strategic role of mismatching, where players voluntarily form inefficient teams or forego the formation of efficient teams, respectively. Strategic mismatching can be rational when players realize a competitive advantage (e.g. harming other competitors). In addition, the results show that free riding can be beneficial for a team in combination with strategic mismatching and that the loser?s curse may be welfare improving by mitigating the problem of strategic mismatching.
Economies of scope, ddc:330, J44, Markteintritt, Trittbrettfahrerverhalten, teams, tournament, C72, Asymmetrische Information, Nichtkooperatives Spiel, Wettbewerb, free-rider effect, J41, Vertragstheorie, mismatch, Tournament, D21, Theorie
Economies of scope, ddc:330, J44, Markteintritt, Trittbrettfahrerverhalten, teams, tournament, C72, Asymmetrische Information, Nichtkooperatives Spiel, Wettbewerb, free-rider effect, J41, Vertragstheorie, mismatch, Tournament, D21, Theorie
| selected citations These citations are derived from selected sources. This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | 0 | |
| popularity This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network. | Average | |
| influence This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | Average | |
| impulse This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network. | Average |
