
doi: 10.2139/ssrn.2172575
Existing literature on mixed oligopoly focuses on competition among different types of firms but ignores their possible cooperation. We allow cooperation between public firm and private firm through subcontracting in a Hotelling mixed duopoly model. We find that when subcontracting is possible, the equilibrium without subcontracting is not socially optimal since subcontracting can lower total production costs. And if both firms engage in subcontracting, the existence of public firm can guarantee the first best equilibrium, whether it is the low cost firm or not. But when private firm is the low cost firm, it is more profitable for it to choose vertical foreclosure. And the consequent equilibrium is not socially desirable anymore.
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