
doi: 10.2139/ssrn.2120407
handle: 10419/59720
We put forward a model of private goods with externalities. Agents derive benefit from communicating with each other. In order to communicate they need to have a language in common. Learning languages is costly. In this setting no individually rational and feasible Groves mechanism exists. We characterize the best-in-class feasible Groves mechanism and the best-in-class individually rational Groves mechanism.
Budget Surplus or Deficit, public economics ;, ddc:330, Groves Mechanisms, Externality, Budget Surplus or Deficit, Pareto Undominated Mechanisms, Pareto Undominated, D70, C60, D62, Groves Mechanisms, Externality, jel: jel:D70, jel: jel:C60, jel: jel:D62
Budget Surplus or Deficit, public economics ;, ddc:330, Groves Mechanisms, Externality, Budget Surplus or Deficit, Pareto Undominated Mechanisms, Pareto Undominated, D70, C60, D62, Groves Mechanisms, Externality, jel: jel:D70, jel: jel:C60, jel: jel:D62
| selected citations These citations are derived from selected sources. This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | 0 | |
| popularity This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network. | Average | |
| influence This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | Average | |
| impulse This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network. | Average |
