
"This paper presents a formal theory of reciprocity. Reciprocity means that people reward kind actions and punish unkind ones. The theory takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by it’s consequences but also by the intention underlying this action. The theory explains the relevant stylized facts of a wide range of experimental games. Among them are the ultimatum game, the gift-exchange game, a reduced best-shot game, the dictator game, the prisoner's dilemma, public goods games, and the investment game. Further, the theory explains why subjects behave differently in treatments where they experience the actions of real persons compared to treatments where they face 'actions' caused by a random device. Finally, the theory explains why in bilateral interactions outcomes tend to be ''fair'' whereas in competitive markets even extremely unfair distributions may arise."
game theory, Economics, Reciprocity, Experimental studies, fairness, cooperation, Individual preferences, reciprocity, 10007 Department of Economics, IEW Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (former), info:eu-repo/classification/ddc/330, Reciprocity, experimental games, prisoner's dilemma, ddc:330, cooperation; fairness; game theory; reciprocity, 330 Economics, Reciprocity, fairness, cooperation, competition, game theory, Utility theory for games, competition, jel: jel:H41, jel: jel:D64, jel: jel:C7, jel: jel:C92, jel: jel:C70, jel: jel:C91
game theory, Economics, Reciprocity, Experimental studies, fairness, cooperation, Individual preferences, reciprocity, 10007 Department of Economics, IEW Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (former), info:eu-repo/classification/ddc/330, Reciprocity, experimental games, prisoner's dilemma, ddc:330, cooperation; fairness; game theory; reciprocity, 330 Economics, Reciprocity, fairness, cooperation, competition, game theory, Utility theory for games, competition, jel: jel:H41, jel: jel:D64, jel: jel:C7, jel: jel:C92, jel: jel:C70, jel: jel:C91
| selected citations These citations are derived from selected sources. This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | 2K | |
| popularity This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network. | Top 0.1% | |
| influence This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | Top 0.1% | |
| impulse This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network. | Top 10% |
