This paper analyzes the possibility of extending Charter protection to the non-human great apes (orangutans, gorillas, chimpanzees, and bonobos). It is argued that great apes are plausibly people under Canadian law who benefit from the s.7 Charter right to 'life, liberty, and security of the person'. The law on this point (as many legal points) is argued to be indeterminate. The legal claim that great apes are people protected by the Charter is analyzed from several different perspectives. This paper begins from the perspective of animal rights activism, viewing litigation of this issue as a strategy for social change. It discusses why an activist would pursue this legal strategy, how such a challenge fits in with the broader animal rights movement, what activists should hope to achieve through this litigation, and where they should begin. The second section moves to a scientific and philosophical viewpoint in order to build an empirical and conceptual background for the arguments to follow. This section examines the general (non-legal) understandings of 'person-hood' and illustrates the psychological properties of the great apes that will be relevant to their Charter claim. The third section shifts to a legal perspective. The claim that great apes are people is considered narrowly in the Canadian legal context. The aim is not to show that the great apes are demonstrably people under the Charter, but only that there is sufficient legal room for a plausible claim for their inclusion into this group, thereby making space for activists to pursue such a challenge.