The Condercet Paradox Revisited
Copyright policy )The Condercet Paradox Revisited
This paper discusses the Condorcet paradox within a strategic bargaining model with majority voting, exogenous recognition probabilities, and no discounting. The analysis employs the concepts of bargaining power, risk coefficient and perfect equilibrium. It is shown that stationarity of subgames perfect equilibria ensure agreement within finite expected time and that, for generic parameter values, SSPEs are unique and exclude Condorcet cycles.
- Tinbergen Institute Netherlands
- University of Amsterdam Netherlands
- Maastricht University
- School of Business and Economics, Econometrics and Operations Research Netherlands
- Maastricht University Netherlands
Economics and Econometrics, SDG 16 - Peace, majority rule, public economics ;, INFORMATION, Decision theory, C73, D72, Voting theory, VOTING MODELS, CORE, Condorcet-Paradoxon, Verhandlungstheorie, C78, INTRANSITIVITIES, strategic bargaining, ddc:330, Consistent Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior; [Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory; Political Processes], Condorcet Paradox, Risikoaversion, Risk Aversion, Justice and Strong Institutions, Neue politische Ökonomie, BARGAINING MODEL, Stochastic games, stochastic differential games, Condorcet paradox, STOCHASTIC GAMES, NOWHERE DENSENESS, Bargaining, Condorcet Paradox, Consistent Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, Risk Aversion, Compromise Prone, Bargaining, PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM, Social Sciences (miscellaneous), Compromise Prone, MAJORITY-RULE, jel: jel:C73, jel: jel:D72, jel: jel:C78
Economics and Econometrics, SDG 16 - Peace, majority rule, public economics ;, INFORMATION, Decision theory, C73, D72, Voting theory, VOTING MODELS, CORE, Condorcet-Paradoxon, Verhandlungstheorie, C78, INTRANSITIVITIES, strategic bargaining, ddc:330, Consistent Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior; [Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory; Political Processes], Condorcet Paradox, Risikoaversion, Risk Aversion, Justice and Strong Institutions, Neue politische Ökonomie, BARGAINING MODEL, Stochastic games, stochastic differential games, Condorcet paradox, STOCHASTIC GAMES, NOWHERE DENSENESS, Bargaining, Condorcet Paradox, Consistent Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, Risk Aversion, Compromise Prone, Bargaining, PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM, Social Sciences (miscellaneous), Compromise Prone, MAJORITY-RULE, jel: jel:C73, jel: jel:D72, jel: jel:C78
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