Strategic Delegation Improves Cartel Stability

descriptionPublicationkeyboard_double_arrow_right Article , Research , Preprint , Report 01 Jan 2010Embargo end date: 16 Jun 2017 Germany, Netherlands English Publisher:Elsevier BVJournal:SSRN Electronic Journal (eissn: 1556-5068,

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Authors: Han, M.A.;

doi: 10.2139/ssrn.1729144 , 10.18452/4429

handle: 11245/1.367983 , 10419/79630

Strategic Delegation Improves Cartel Stability

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Abstract

Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) show that strategic delegation reduces firm profits in the one-shot Cournot game. Allowing for infinitely repeated interaction, strategic delegation can increase firm profits as it improves cartel stability.

Countries

Germany, Netherlands

Related Organizations

University of Amsterdam
Netherlands
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Germany

Keywords

L13, 330, ddc:330, L41, Gleichgewichtsstabilität, L20, cartel stability, 330 Wirtschaft, ddc:310, Wiederholte Spiele, strategic delegation, Kooperative Führung, collusion, 310 Sammlungen allgemeiner Statistiken, Kartell, strategic delegation, collusion, cartel stability, D43, Theorie, jel: jel:D43, jel: jel:L41, jel: jel:L20, jel: jel:L13

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