Technology Adoption, Social Learning, and Economic Policy
Copyright policy )Technology Adoption, Social Learning, and Economic Policy
We study a two-player dynamic investment model with information externalities and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a unique switching equilibrium. When the public information is sufficiently high and a social planer therefore expects an investment boom, investments should be taxed. Conversely, any positive investment tax is suboptimally high if the public information is sufficiently unfavorable.We also show that an investment tax may increase overall investment activity.
- Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf Germany
- University of Duesseldorf Germany
- University of Leicester United Kingdom
- Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München Germany
- Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México Mexico
330, delay, Information Externality; Strategic Waiting; Delay; Information Cascade; Investment Boom; Optimal Taxation, Optimal Taxation, Information Externality, Information Cascade, Optimale Besteuerung, information externality, strategic waiting, delay, information cascade, investment boom, optimal taxation, information externality, Delay, Informationsverbreitung, ddc:330, ddc:650, Investment Boom, Betriebliche Investitionstheorie, investment boom, optimal taxation, Externer Effekt, Innovationswettbewerb, D83, D62, Strategic Waiting, strategic waiting, information cascade, Information Externality, Strategic Waiting, Delay, Information Cascade, Investment Boom, Optimal Taxation, jel: jel:D62, jel: jel:D83
330, delay, Information Externality; Strategic Waiting; Delay; Information Cascade; Investment Boom; Optimal Taxation, Optimal Taxation, Information Externality, Information Cascade, Optimale Besteuerung, information externality, strategic waiting, delay, information cascade, investment boom, optimal taxation, information externality, Delay, Informationsverbreitung, ddc:330, ddc:650, Investment Boom, Betriebliche Investitionstheorie, investment boom, optimal taxation, Externer Effekt, Innovationswettbewerb, D83, D62, Strategic Waiting, strategic waiting, information cascade, Information Externality, Strategic Waiting, Delay, Information Cascade, Investment Boom, Optimal Taxation, jel: jel:D62, jel: jel:D83
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