Voluntary disclosures convey information through two channels: 1) the direct revelation channel in which the disclosed body of information is used to update beliefs, and 2) the signaling channel in which inferences are drawn from the fact that the firm chose what information to disclose. I study the overall informativeness of both channels in a partially-revealing signaling game that is augmented with an additional round of information revelation. I find there is a strong negative interaction between the channels. So strong that one channel acting in isolation may reveal more information than both acting together. Mandating disclosure may be harmful because it reduces choice, thus reducing signaling. Specifically, imposing a minimum disclosure level may 1) eliminate the most informative equilibrium, and 2) support the least informative equilibrium: a pooling equilibrium at the minimum disclosure level survives belief-based equilibrium selection only under mandatory disclosure. This is a serious concern because the pooling equilibrium may Pareto dominate all other equilibria.