
A model is presented of a uniform price auction where bidders compete in demand schedules; the model allows for common and private values in the absence of exogenous noise. It is shown how private information yields more market power than the levels seen with full information. Results obtained here are broadly consistent with evidence from asset auctions, may help explain the response of central banks to the crisis, and suggest potential improvements in the auction formats of asset auctions. (JEL: D44, D82, G14, E58)
reverse auctions, ddc:330, adverse selection, adverse selection; market power; reverse auctions; bid shading;, G14, market power, D82, Adverse selection; Bid shading; Market power; Reverse auctions, bid shading, adverse selection, market power, reverse auctions, bid shading, E58, D44, jel: jel:D82, jel: jel:D44, jel: jel:E58, jel: jel:G14
reverse auctions, ddc:330, adverse selection, adverse selection; market power; reverse auctions; bid shading;, G14, market power, D82, Adverse selection; Bid shading; Market power; Reverse auctions, bid shading, adverse selection, market power, reverse auctions, bid shading, E58, D44, jel: jel:D82, jel: jel:D44, jel: jel:E58, jel: jel:G14
| selected citations These citations are derived from selected sources. This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | 11 | |
| popularity This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network. | Top 10% | |
| influence This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | Average | |
| impulse This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network. | Average |
