Foreclosure in Contests
Copyright policy )Foreclosure in Contests
We consider a contest where one firm has a cost advantage over rivals. Instead of taking the set of rivals as given, the favorite can transfer the source of its advantage wholly or partially to a subset of rival firms. Foreclosure of those firms that do not receive the cost reduction may result. We present conditions under which this transfer will occur and consider the welfare properties of exclusion. The expected payoff of the dominant firm is independent of the size of the cost reduction transferred to rivals. Applications include lobbying, patent races and access to essential infrastructure.
- The Arctic University of Norway Norway
- Norwegian School of Economics Norway
contest, Foreclosure; contest, VDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Bedriftsøkonomi: 213, Foreclosure, jel: jel:L24, jel: jel:D21
contest, Foreclosure; contest, VDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Bedriftsøkonomi: 213, Foreclosure, jel: jel:L24, jel: jel:D21
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