Pricing in Position Auctions and Online Advertising

descriptionPublicationkeyboard_double_arrow_right Article , Other literature type 01 Jan 2010 English Publisher:Elsevier BVJournal:SSRN Electronic Journal (eissn: 1556-5068,

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Authors: Yenmez, M. Bumin;

doi: 10.2139/ssrn.1338656 , 10.1007/s00199-013-0748-0

Pricing in Position Auctions and Online Advertising

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Abstract

The paper studies whether online search engines can increase revenues by changing the commonly used auction format of second-price auction. The author proves that, if the pricing functions are regular, then there is an ex post equilibrium of the ascending auction that is ex post payoff equivalent to the celebrated VCG mechanism.

Related Organizations

Stanford University
United States
Carnegie Mellon University
United States
Boston College
United States

Keywords

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models, multidimensional types, online advertising, position auctions, Marketing, advertising, ex post payoff equivalence

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