
handle: 10419/53192 , 10419/104274
We investigate the computational complexity of several decision problems in hedonic coalition formation games and demonstrate that attaining stability in such games remains NP-hard even when they are additive. Precisely, we prove that when either core stability or strict core stability is under consideration, the existence problem of a stable coalition structure is NP-hard in the strong sense. Furthermore, the corresponding decision problems with respect to the existence of a Nash stable coalition structure and of an individually stable coalition structure turn out to be NP-complete in the strong sense.
Computational Complexity, 330, hedonic games, Decision theory for games, Additive Preferences, NP-hard, Komplexe Systeme, C71, D70, D71, Cooperative games, additive preferences, C70, Applications of game theory, Entscheidungstheorie, Abstract computational complexity for mathematical programming problems, NP-complete, Hedonic Games, computational complexity, ddc:330, Nash-Gleichgewicht, Koalition, 300, Coalition Formation, C63, additive preferences; coalition formation; computational complexity; hedonic games; NP-hard; NP-complete, coalition formation, D02, Core, Nichtlineare Optimierung, Theorie, Additive Preferences, Coalition Formation, Computational Complexity, Hedonic Games, NP-hard, NP-complete, jel: jel:C63, jel: jel:D02, jel: jel:C70, jel: jel:D70, jel: jel:C71, jel: jel:D71
Computational Complexity, 330, hedonic games, Decision theory for games, Additive Preferences, NP-hard, Komplexe Systeme, C71, D70, D71, Cooperative games, additive preferences, C70, Applications of game theory, Entscheidungstheorie, Abstract computational complexity for mathematical programming problems, NP-complete, Hedonic Games, computational complexity, ddc:330, Nash-Gleichgewicht, Koalition, 300, Coalition Formation, C63, additive preferences; coalition formation; computational complexity; hedonic games; NP-hard; NP-complete, coalition formation, D02, Core, Nichtlineare Optimierung, Theorie, Additive Preferences, Coalition Formation, Computational Complexity, Hedonic Games, NP-hard, NP-complete, jel: jel:C63, jel: jel:D02, jel: jel:C70, jel: jel:D70, jel: jel:C71, jel: jel:D71
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