Vote-Buying and Growth
Copyright policy )Vote-Buying and Growth
Vote-buying is widely used by parties in developing countries to influence the outcome of elections. We examine the impact of vote-buying on growth. We consider a model with a poverty trap where redistribution can promote growth. We show that vote-buying contributes to the persistence of poverty as taxed wealthy people buy votes from poor people. We then show that there exists a democratic constitution that breaks vote-buying and promotes growth. Such a constitution involves rotating agenda setting, a taxpayer-protection rule, and repeated voting. The latter rule makes vote-buying prohibitively costly.
- EIDGENOESSISCHE TECHNISCHE HOCHSCHULE ZUERICH Switzerland
- ETH Zurich Switzerland
- Institute for the Study of Labor Germany
- Economic Research Centre Azerbaijan
Korruption, Economic development, Repeated Voting, Economics, Armut, Vote-Buying, repeated voting, History, political science, Vote-buying, political economy, D72, Wahlverhalten, Applications of game theory, vote-buying, I30, Economic dynamics, Voting rules, Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie, vote-buying, political economy, poverty traps, economic development, voting rules, repeated voting, O10, Wirtschaftswachstum, info:eu-repo/classification/ddc/330, ddc:330, poverty traps, Poverty traps, Abstimmungsregel, P16, Umverteilung, economic development, Political Economy, Economic growth models, Political economy, voting rules, Entwicklungsländer, Poverty Traps, I20, Economic Development, Voting Rules, Theorie, Repeated voting, jel: jel:I20, jel: jel:D72, jel: jel:I30, jel: jel:O10, jel: jel:P16
Korruption, Economic development, Repeated Voting, Economics, Armut, Vote-Buying, repeated voting, History, political science, Vote-buying, political economy, D72, Wahlverhalten, Applications of game theory, vote-buying, I30, Economic dynamics, Voting rules, Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie, vote-buying, political economy, poverty traps, economic development, voting rules, repeated voting, O10, Wirtschaftswachstum, info:eu-repo/classification/ddc/330, ddc:330, poverty traps, Poverty traps, Abstimmungsregel, P16, Umverteilung, economic development, Political Economy, Economic growth models, Political economy, voting rules, Entwicklungsländer, Poverty Traps, I20, Economic Development, Voting Rules, Theorie, Repeated voting, jel: jel:I20, jel: jel:D72, jel: jel:I30, jel: jel:O10, jel: jel:P16
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