
doi: 10.2139/ssrn.1145307
handle: 11250/163937
A very close link of G-S, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem to Arrow's impossibility theorem is shown. G-S is derived as a corollary: from a strategy-proof singleseat election method F is constructed an election method G that contradicts Arrow's theorem.
Preferential election methods; impossibility theorem, VDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Statsvitenskap og organisasjonsteori: 240, jel: jel:D72
Preferential election methods; impossibility theorem, VDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Statsvitenskap og organisasjonsteori: 240, jel: jel:D72
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