Abstract : This monograph investigates Khalid Bin Waleed's 7th century (AD 633-634) campaign against the Sassanid Persian Empire in Mesopotamia to trace any evidence that substantiates the application of modern characteristics of operational art. The criteria used to ascertain the presence of critical characteristics of operational art in the Persian Campaign are based on a synthesis of the theories of James Schneider and Shimon Naveh. First, did Khalid Bin Waleed develop operational objectives through a cognitive tension between the demands of strategic objectives and those of tactical actions? Second, were his actions oriented towards causing disruption of the enemy system of forces? Third, did he conduct an operational maneuver that aimed to achieve local superiority? Fourth, was his operational approach oriented towards accumulating the effects of tactical actions in pursuit of strategic objectives? Lastly, did his actions conform to a broad and universal theory? The monograph concludes that Khalid Bin Waleed employed characteristics and elements of operational art to defeat the Persian forces in Mesopotamia. He established operational objectives that achieved the strategic aim of seizing the Persian territories in the most efficient manner despite operating in a resource-constrained environment. Throughout the Campaign, his use of operational maneuver permitted freedom of action, placed his units in positions of advantage, and achieved operational and tactical surprise with devastating effects. Khalid Bin Waleed's operational approach was based on gaining and maintaining initiative through sequential and simultaneous operations. He relied on carefully planned and swift offensive operations, mobile warfare, and securing the allegiance of the local tribes and towns. Khalid Bin Waleed's actions were in accordance with the Quranic concept of war, which gave his operational actions coherence as well as a broad appeal among the local populace of the conquered cities.