Abstract : The U.S. was not prepared for the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) threat it faced in Afghanistan and Iraq. IED's were the cause of over fifty percent of the U.S. casualties, and emerged as the "weapon of choice" for the enemy. The warfighters were in need of solutions, which the Services were unable to deliver quickly. This precluded the warfighters from being able to exploit the enemies inherent weaknesses. Therefore, the enemy was able to adapt and change their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) faster than the U.S. could respond to defeat the IED threat. As a result, the Department of Defense created an ad hoc organization, Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), to circumvent the bureaucratic processes of the Services. Recent reports indicate that JIEDDO and some other counter-IED (CIED) Task Forces are having some success. However, JIEDDO lacks the proper command authority to truly change the outcome on the battlefield. Additionally, evidence suggests that the IED threat has the potential to proliferate beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. This paper examines the IED threat and the genesis of JIEDDO and recommends future command relationships that would better posture the U.S. for the "Long War".