Abstract : This monograph examines the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) as presented in the 1997 version of FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations. Numerous military professionals and decision-making theorists hold that an analytical process such as the MDMP is inappropriate for tactical operations. Officers supporting this line of reasoning suggest that the tempo and uncertainty of the brigade/battalion fight calls for an intuitive decision-making process. Through a detailed analysis of what the MDMP is theoretically designed to accomplish, this monograph provides evidence to counter this criticism. The structure of the paper provides this evidence by first establishing the validity of using an analytical model in the tactical environment, and then demonstrating that the MDMP is the right analytical model. The first part of the paper, an examination of the MDMP in the context of problem-solving theory, suggests that an analytical planning process is needed to support future intuitive decisions. This justifies the use of the use of the MDMP's analytical processes, answering the first question. The second part of the paper determines whether the MDMP is the right analytical model. The paper accomplishes this by examining the MDMP against two sets of criteria. The first set, are planning imperatives suggested by historical doctrine. The second set represents the psychological processes that human decision-makers need to overcome the combined friction of the tactical environment. Together, these two sets of criteria explain how the MDMP is an appropriate analytical model, which answers the second question. This monograph suggests that command and control at the tactical level represents a system where analytical planning is necessary for successful intuitive decision-making. The MDMP meets the U.S. Army s institutional expectations, represented by