Abstract : This monograph examines whether the United States' unilateral ban on conventional anti-personnel mines will significantly impair the effectiveness of US Army countermobility operation. Land mines and mine warfare play critical roles in US countermobility doctrine, and the loss of one entire category of mines could constrain the Army's ability to successfully perform countermobility missions. The prospect of such failure is alarming since successful mine warfare has often been the difference between life and death for hard pressed defenders. This monograph attempts to anticipate both the nature and severity of such consequences. The monograph begins by exploring the origins and nature of the anti-personnel mine ban. It does this by tracing the history of mines and mine warfare, and the global problems that this history has created. Next, the paper covers the current US inventory of anti-personnel mines to determine which mines (and capabilities) the ban eliminates. The monograph then examines the tasks that land mines serve under countermobility doctrine. This section is particularly important since it introduces the concepts that the paper later uses in the analysis. The monograph completes its fact gathering focus with a treatment of the countermine measures available to modem armies. Once the background knowledge set is complete, the monograph turns to analyzing the ban's effects. The monograph's analysis portion begins with a brief discussion of the Second Battle of El Alamein. The monograph uses this action as its historical laboratory because land mines played a central role in the battle, but very few of the mines (only three percent) were of the anti-personnel variety. For this (and other) reasons therefore, Alamein approximates battle under the ban.