Abstract : Amidst the euphoria of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War came a realization that strategic warning of a Soviet or Warsaw Pact attack on Western Europe had increased from tens of hours or a few days to weeks or even months. However, not everyone was quite as optimistic. Arguing against the position that the new longer warning scenarios would obviate the need for rapid response airlift, Commander-in Chief of USTRANSCOM, General H.T. Johnson stated, I'm not sure we will have the warning... Warning time in itself is uninteresting unless you make a decision TO MOBILIZE. Historically, we have not reacted to warning. (17:64) Having enough strategic warning is meaningless if the political decision makers who receive this warning do not (or cannot) respond within the warning time. Thus, these so-called intelligence failures are frequently, in fact, a lack of political decisions or failure to execute a meaningful response. According to a former Air Force Chief of Staff, this results in the military response time often being zero.