
Workers in online labor markets routinely misrepresent the value of effort, both through shirking and misreporting performance. We execute a field experiment on Amazon MTurk to determine whether honesty oaths impact the cost of worker lies. Employing a design that follows the “die roll” paradigm, we determine that oaths elicit more truthful behavior, although they primarily impact extreme lies. Oath-taking decreased the cost of misreportingby 12%. While shirking is widespread, oaths marginally decrease it. Male workers misreport performance more often on average than females, yet both sexes are equally responsive to oath-taking. JEL Codes: D90, D91, C8, C93, J9
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