
doi: 10.15581/009.47.735
handle: 10171/57314 , 10171/36177
El artículo estudia desde una perspectiva metafísica cómo categoriza la voluntad Duns Escoto contrastando su posición con la del Aquinate. Como para Escoto la libertad (affectio iustitiae) pertenece intrínsecamente a la voluntad, esta solo puede ser una potencia activa: un poder. La categoría de apetito solo es válida para la voluntad natural que no es voluntad en sentido propio. Para argumentar estos aspectos se da particular relevancia a las cuestiones De frui (Ordinatio I, d. 1).
libertad, Will, power, Potencia, Duns Scotus, Thomas Aquinas, Libertad, Duns Escoto, freedom, potencia, Tomás de Aquino, Voluntad
libertad, Will, power, Potencia, Duns Scotus, Thomas Aquinas, Libertad, Duns Escoto, freedom, potencia, Tomás de Aquino, Voluntad
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