Cash holdings is an important factor in the determination of corporate financing policy providing unconditional liquidity available at any given time. The recent Global Financial Crisis also highlights the importance of corporate cash holdings. In this thesis, we examine the marginal value of cash holdings under different economic conditions, combining financial constraints and corporate governance into our analysis. We also investigate the time-series dynamics of corporate cash management (i.e. the adjustment speed of cash holdings). The First Essay studies the impact of cash holdings on firm value in the time of the financial crisis relative to the pre-crisis period. Specifically, we hypothesize that the crisis value effect will differ according to firms’ financial constraint status and their corporate governance. We follow Faulkender and Wang (2006) and construct a sample of 11,017 firm-year observations with 2,031 firms over the period 2002 to 2010. Our findings show that corporate cash holdings become more valuable during the financial crisis, but the crisis value effect for constrained firms is less than that of unconstrained firms. In terms of corporate governance, we show that the governance effect on cash holdings becomes more pronounced during the financial crisis, and the governance effect is more significant if a firm is financially constrained. The Second Essay examines the adjustment speed of cash holdings. More importantly, we hypothesise that there is an optimal range of cash holdings, and cash rebalancing will occur only if firms’ cash levels reach the upper and lower bounds of the target range. We examine a sample of companies from 1962 to 2014. To test our hypotheses, we employ a multi-faceted empirical strategy working from a simple to a more sophisticated model: (1) a dummy variable approach; (2) a cubic model; (3) a threshold regression model. Our results show that there exists two thresholds with three cash regimes in the data, which is consistent with the argument of having an optimal range of cash holdings. Our findings also show that firms in the high and low cash regimes make more speedy cash adjustment, which is almost double the speed of firms in the intermediate cash regime. The results indicate that ignorance of the potential existence of an optimal cash range, combined with a failure to account for the heterogeneous path toward cash target, “double down” a downward bias regarding the state of knowledge for adjustment speed of cash holdings. The Third Essay further explores the adjustment speed of cash holdings, incorporating debt capacity, product market competition and government debt into the analysis. Our core findings show that firms will accelerate cash adjustment when debt capacity is low and decelerate cash adjustment when debt capacity is high. Moreover, our analysis demonstrates that product market competition impacts on cash-rich firms, but has little impact on cash-poor firms. With respect to government debt, we conjecture and articulate two possible mechanisms that firms might follow in response to an increase of supply in federal debt. We show that firms in the high cash regime follow the crowding out mechanism, whereas firms in the low cash regime are more likely to follow the funding growth mechanism. The results demonstrate that accounting for heterogeneities in a firm’s cash policy is a key part of better understanding corporate liquidity management.