What impact, if any, does fiscal decentralisation have on economic growth? Does income help explain the varying degrees of fiscal decentralisation observed across countries? Further investigations of the inter-relationships between fiscal decentralisation and economic growth are timely given that fiscal decentralisation remains at the forefront of many OECD policy agendas and a large number of developing and transitional economies have begun to decentralise fiscal responsibilities. The recent rhetoric concerning the impact of Australian Commonwealth-State relations on economic growth also provides motivation to seek a deeper understanding of the importance of fiscal federalism for developed economies. To further inform on these issues, this thesis aligns empirical analysis with wider intuitive discussion from previously separate strands of literature. The empirical contributions of the research are fourfold. Firstly, measures of fiscal decentralisation are refined to better account for the impact of subnational fiscal autonomy on economic growth. Secondly, incorporating the literature on decentralisation, democracy and corruption, the analysis includes previously omitted political and public sector decentralisation variables that potentially affect the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and growth. Thirdly, the thesis attempts to reconcile the literature on the determinants of fiscal decentralisation with the studies of decentralisation and growth. The former suggests that countries with higher levels of income are likely to be more decentralised. If this is true, economic growth - leading to higher levels of income - could be used to constitute a new level of decentralisation. Further, there may be omitted variables that simultaneously affect both fiscal decentralisation and economic growth. Thus, the thesis considers the possibility that endogeneity or simultaneity exists in the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and growth. Finally, a recent study of the indirect relationship between decentralisation and growth is extended to a panel data setting. Overall, the thesis draws attention to the fragility of the results found in previous studies. Empirical results in this area clearly depend on the measures used, the inclusion of political variables, chosen specification and country sample. There is some evidence of a negative relationship between fiscal decentralisation and economic growth for developing countries, but little or no direct relationship for developed countries. However, in the latter case, there is some support for the hypothesis that a medium degree of fiscal decentralisation is positively related to growth in the capital stock.