The modern notion of history was definitively formulated in the eighteenth century, when Rousseau and Kant restricted the access of humans to their own supersensible, substantial nature (essence). Man appeared as a historical being, one whose definition lies in his development (or, in the case of Rousseau, fall), in his negativity. As soon as this vision of human nature was made public, a question arose, which dominated the subsequent tradition of the philosophy of history up to our days. Namely, the question of the access of humans to historicity as such-to pure historicity or pure temporality, apart from this or that particular historical development. Such access would permit humans both knowledge of themselves and spontaneity of action. Even blocked from the transcendent, God-like, absolute freedom, humans may still be free historical actors if they can deliver themselves from the determination of past and future, which forces them into the alienated labor of development, or into the labor of mourning. They would still act and produce, but do so as free subjects, out of nothing. If human essence lies in human history, then why does it move forward, what is the principle of its movement? Such a principle, for human history, may only be human freedom, human spontaneity and