One of the problems involved in doing the history of philosophy is reinterpreting past philosophers in such a way that the relevance of their work to contemporary discussion can become clear. In doing so one often finds that certain doctrines to which a philosopher himself attached great significance may not be central to a particular line of his argument. Recent efforts at interpreting Kant have attempted, for example, to disentangle the objectionable part of the Kantian metaphysics from the “objective” argument contained therein. The whole doctrine of transcendental psychology in Kant’s first Critique, for example, may perhaps be shelved without injuring the rational core of the argument. With Hegel, however, the case seems prima facie more difficult, since Hegel’s whole system is seemingly tied down to a very obscure metaphysics, that of the “World Spirit.” However, just as not all of Kant’s doctrine is necessary to his philosophy, perhaps not all of Hegel’s philosophy is inextricably bound up with commitment to such shadowy entities. The author tries to draw out the central argumentative core of Hegel’s Science of Logic. To do this he first sketches briefly what Hegel takes to be the goal of such a theory. Second, he outlines the basic logical structure of the work. The result is a presentation of Hegel’s philosophy that will make it not the obscure confidant of World Spirit, but rather one not far from contemporary concerns.