The post-Cold War era is marked by an increased occurrence of ethnic conflict in heterogeneous societies. One of the solutions posed to resolve ethnic conflict is Federalism, a ‘multi-tier’ governance system that devolves certain powers to sub-units of a federation, making them more autonomous. Pakistan has also experienced ethnic tensions fueled by relative deprivation and developmental disparities, primarily in the form of center-province strains, that have also escalated into episodes of violence. While officially a federal parliamentary republic, the state’s centralizing tendencies have prevented federalism to be followed in spirit. However, in 2010, Pakistan looked towards Federalism as one of the solutions to the issue and therefore, the 18th amendment was introduced. This paper analyzes the impact the 18th amendment had on addressing the provincial grievances that had fueled ethnic conflict in Pakistan, and by implication, its effectiveness as a tool for solving ethnic conflict. It employs qualitative research methodology including review of existing literature regarding Federalism and the 18th amendment. The paper concludes that Federalism in Pakistan has only been partially successful in resolving ethnic conflict as developmental inequalities continued to persist despite the attempts to reduce them through 18th amendment. Moreover, the paper finds that the amendment seems to have created intra-provincial ethnic tensions. Lastly, while the 18th amendment proves to be a step in the right direction, failure to address capacity issues has prevented it from achieving its intended objectives.