Two-Sided Matching with (Almost) One-Sided Preferences
Copyright policy )Two-Sided Matching with (Almost) One-Sided Preferences
In a two-sided matching context we show how we can predict stable matchings by considering only one side’s preferences and the mutually acceptable pairs of agents. Our methodology consists of identifying impossible matches, i.e., pairs of agents that can never be matched together in a stable matching of any problem consistent with the partial data. We analyze data from the French academic job market for mathematicians and show that the match of about 45 percent of positions (and about 60 percent of candidates) does not depend on the preferences of the hired candidates, unobserved and submitted at the final stage of the market. (JEL C78, I23, J41, J44)
- King’s University United States
- Normandie Université France
- City University of New York United States
- University of Rouen France
- Baruch College United States
and Organizing Microeconomic Data • Data Access, French academic job market, Hall's marriage theorem, Partial matching data, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C8 - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology • Computer Programs/C.C8.C81 - Methodology for Collecting, Stable matchings, Estimating, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C78 - Bargaining Theory • Matching Theory, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, JEL: J - Labor and Demographic Economics/J.J4 - Particular Labor Markets/J.J4.J41 - Labor Contracts
and Organizing Microeconomic Data • Data Access, French academic job market, Hall's marriage theorem, Partial matching data, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C8 - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology • Computer Programs/C.C8.C81 - Methodology for Collecting, Stable matchings, Estimating, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C78 - Bargaining Theory • Matching Theory, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, JEL: J - Labor and Demographic Economics/J.J4 - Particular Labor Markets/J.J4.J41 - Labor Contracts
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