
We introduce a new distinction between inequality in initial endowments (e.g., ability, inherited wealth) and inequality of what one can obtain as rewards (e.g., prestigious positions, money). We show that, when society allocates resources via tournaments, these two types of inequality have opposing effects on equilibrium behavior and well-being. Greater inequality of rewards hurts most people—both the middle class and the poor—who are forced into greater effort. Conversely, greater inequality of endowments benefits the middle class. Thus, the correctness of our intuitions about the implications of inequality is hugely affected by the type of inequality considered. (JEL D63, D82)
inequality, dispersive order, star order, relative position, Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement, C72, D82, D62, rewards, ordinal rank, D63, endowments, D31, tournaments, games, Asymmetric and Private Information, jel: jel:D63, jel: jel:D82
inequality, dispersive order, star order, relative position, Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement, C72, D82, D62, rewards, ordinal rank, D63, endowments, D31, tournaments, games, Asymmetric and Private Information, jel: jel:D63, jel: jel:D82
| citations This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | 41 | |
| popularity This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network. | Top 10% | |
| influence This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | Top 10% | |
| impulse This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network. | Top 10% |
