
Are natural resources a “curse” or a “blessing”? The empirical evidence suggests that either outcome is possible. This paper surveys a variety of hypotheses and supporting evidence for why some countries benefit and others lose from the presence of natural resources. These include that a resource bonanza induces appreciation of the real exchange rate, deindustrialization, and bad growth prospects, and that these adverse effects are more severe in volatile countries with bad institutions and lack of rule of law, corruption, presidential democracies, and underdeveloped financial systems. Another hypothesis is that a resource boom reinforces rent grabbing and civil conflict especially if institutions are bad, induces corruption especially in nondemocratic countries, and keeps in place bad policies. Finally, resource rich developing economies seem unable to successfully convert their depleting exhaustible resources into other productive assets. The survey also offers some welfare-based fiscal rules for harnessing resource windfalls in developed and developing economies. (JEL O47, Q32, Q33)
panel and quasi-experimental evidence, Hotelling-Regel, Rohstoffressourcen, financial development, K42, corruption, O41, volatility, Industriestaaten, C13, Natürliche Ressourcen, C12, sustainable development, ddc:330, resource curse, cross-country, panel and quasi-experimental evidence, Dutch disease, institutions, corruption, financial development, volatility, Hotelling rule, genuine saving, Hartwick rule, natural resource wealth management, sustainable development, Justice and Strong Institutions, natural resource wealth management, F43, Institutionalismus, resource curse, Hotelling rule, SDG 16 - Peace, Welt, Dutch Disease, institutions, Q30, Wirtschaftswachstum, genuine saving, Nachhaltige Entwicklung, Dutch disease, cross-country, Hartwick rule, E01, Entwicklungsländer, Vergleich, jel: jel:F43, jel: jel:C12, jel: jel:C13, jel: jel:K42, jel: jel:E01, jel: jel:O41, jel: jel:O47, jel: jel:Q33, jel: jel:Q32, jel: jel:Q30
panel and quasi-experimental evidence, Hotelling-Regel, Rohstoffressourcen, financial development, K42, corruption, O41, volatility, Industriestaaten, C13, Natürliche Ressourcen, C12, sustainable development, ddc:330, resource curse, cross-country, panel and quasi-experimental evidence, Dutch disease, institutions, corruption, financial development, volatility, Hotelling rule, genuine saving, Hartwick rule, natural resource wealth management, sustainable development, Justice and Strong Institutions, natural resource wealth management, F43, Institutionalismus, resource curse, Hotelling rule, SDG 16 - Peace, Welt, Dutch Disease, institutions, Q30, Wirtschaftswachstum, genuine saving, Nachhaltige Entwicklung, Dutch disease, cross-country, Hartwick rule, E01, Entwicklungsländer, Vergleich, jel: jel:F43, jel: jel:C12, jel: jel:C13, jel: jel:K42, jel: jel:E01, jel: jel:O41, jel: jel:O47, jel: jel:Q33, jel: jel:Q32, jel: jel:Q30
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