AbstractThe Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) posits that policy actors, including elected officials and bureaucrats, aggregate into coalitions based on shared beliefs and coordinate to achieve policy objectives. Yet, bureaucrats are often subject to political control mechanisms understood within a principal‐agent framework. Combining insights from principal‐agent theory and the ACF, we explore the nature of principal‐agent relationships within and across advocacy coalitions in the United States using case studies of nuclear waste management and fair housing policy. Specifically, we develop three propositions regarding principals and agents as members of advocacy coalitions and examine those propositions by comparing the two case studies. We find that powerful elected officials and expert bureaucrats are important resources for coalitions; bureaucrats are in coalitions but face cross‐pressure from principals in opposing coalitions; and control mechanisms embedded in policy designs by principals can limit bureaucratic discretion in a way that aligns with coalition goals.Related ArticlesNeill, Katharine A., and John C. Morris. 2012. “A Tangled Web of Principals and Agents: Examining the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill through a Principal–Agent Lens.” Politics & Policy 40(4): 629–56. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2012.00371.xPeterson, Holly L., Mark K. McBeth, and Michael D. Jones. 2020. “Policy Process Theory for Rural Studies: Navigating Context and Generalization in Rural Policy.” Politics & Policy 48(4): 576–617. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12366Swigger, Alexandra, and Bruce Timothy Heinmiller. 2014. “Advocacy Coalitions and Mental Health Policy: The Adoption of Community Treatment Orders in Ontario.” Politics & Policy 42(2): 246–70. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12066