
doi: 10.1111/jpet.12602
arXiv: 2012.01011
handle: 10419/175367 , 20.500.12876/22718 , 20.500.12876/dvmqM8nv
doi: 10.1111/jpet.12602
arXiv: 2012.01011
handle: 10419/175367 , 20.500.12876/22718 , 20.500.12876/dvmqM8nv
AbstractWe evaluate the goal of maximizing the number of individuals matched to acceptable outcomes. We present two mechanisms that maximize assignments. The first is Pareto efficient and undominated—in terms of the number of assignments—in equilibrium. The second is fair for unassigned agents and assigns weakly more agents than any stable mechanism in equilibrium.
Fairness, 330, maximal matching, School Choice, fairness, Education Policy, Maximum Matching, DegreeDisciplines::Social and Behavioral Sciences::Economics::Public Economics, Economics - Theoretical Economics, Matching, Object Allocation, Economic Theory, C78, HB Economic Theory, market design, ddc:330, matching, Market Design, DegreeDisciplines::Social and Behavioral Sciences::Economics::Economic Theory, object allocation, school choice, D47, Maximal Matching, D63
Fairness, 330, maximal matching, School Choice, fairness, Education Policy, Maximum Matching, DegreeDisciplines::Social and Behavioral Sciences::Economics::Public Economics, Economics - Theoretical Economics, Matching, Object Allocation, Economic Theory, C78, HB Economic Theory, market design, ddc:330, matching, Market Design, DegreeDisciplines::Social and Behavioral Sciences::Economics::Economic Theory, object allocation, school choice, D47, Maximal Matching, D63
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