ABSTRACT This study critically examines China's experimentation with Total Allowable Catches (TACs) as a central element of its evolving fisheries management system. Based on policy review, cross‐case analysis of 32 pilot programs, expert surveys, and stakeholder interviews, we trace how political commitment, institutional trials, and stakeholder engagement have shaped TAC implementation since 2017. The pilots showed that TACs can be made workable in a data‐limited, effort‐based regime. This was achieved by decentralising program design, using Special Fishing Permits to define fishery units, embedding quotas within the seasonal moratorium, testing allocation methods, and introducing basic monitoring systems. These arrangements facilitated compliance and institutional learning, although measurable ecological outcomes remain uncertain due to persistent data limitations. Our findings suggest that pilots can serve as transitional vehicles toward science‐based and rights‐based management, but only if their lessons are institutionalised through law, policy, and practice. We highlight that without clear graduation pathways—anchored in three mutually reinforcing pillars of science‐based decision‐making, integrated monitoring and compliance systems, and rights‐ and incentive‐based governance—China risks locking in administratively convenient but ecologically limited practices. For other developing countries, China's experience shows that pilot strategies can reduce early risks and build capacity when linked to institutional consolidation and long‐term governance reform.