
handle: 2158/1361000
AbstractWe explore monopolistic competition with asymmetric preferences over a variety of goods provided by heterogeneous firms, and compute equilibria (approximating Cournot and Bertrand equilibria when market shares are negligible) through average Morishima elasticities of substitution. Further results concerning pricing and entry emerge under homotheticity and when demands depend on a common aggregator, as with Generalized Additively Separable preferences. Under additivity we can determine which goods are going to be provided under free entry, as well as the selection effects associated with changes in market size, consumers' income, aggregate productivity, and preference parameters.
asymmetric preferences; generalized separability; heterogeneous firms; monopolistic competition; variable markups
asymmetric preferences; generalized separability; heterogeneous firms; monopolistic competition; variable markups
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