AbstractSkepticism about ethical expertise has grown common, raising concerns that bioethicists’ roles are inappropriate or depend on something other than expertise in ethics. While these roles may depend on skills other than those of expertise, overlooking the role of expertise in ethics distorts our conception of moral advising. This paper argues that motivations to reject ethical expertise often stem from concerns about elitism: either an intellectualist elitism, where some privileged elite have supposedly special access in virtue of expertise in moral theory; or an authoritarian elitism, where our reliance on experts in ethics risks violation of autonomy and democracy. The paper sketches an anti‐elitist conception of ethics expertise in bioethics as continuous with an anti‐elitist conception of ethics expertise in common moral practice, undercutting the intellectualism, and then uses this anti‐elitist conception to reject arguments that ethical expertise violates autonomy or democracy. An anti‐elitist picture of ethical expertise both renders it consistent with our general moral practice and allows us to resist skeptical concerns.