Market power in California's water market
Copyright policy )Market power in California's water market
AbstractWe estimate market power in California's surface water market. Market power may distort the potential welfare gains from water marketing. We use a Nash‐Cournot model and derive a closed‐form solution for the extent of market power in a water market setting. We then use this solution to estimate market power in a newly assembled dataset on California's water economy. We show that, under the assumptions of the Nash‐Cournot model, market power in this thin market is limited.
- University of Amsterdam Netherlands
- Department of Economics Switzerland
- Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam Netherlands
- Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
- Department of Finance
Water markets, Market power, Aigua--Preus, C72, ddc:330, D43, California, Cournot-Nash, Q25, 338 - Situació econòmica. Política econòmica. Gestió, control i planificació de l'economia. Producció. Serveis. Turisme. Preus
Water markets, Market power, Aigua--Preus, C72, ddc:330, D43, California, Cournot-Nash, Q25, 338 - Situació econòmica. Política econòmica. Gestió, control i planificació de l'economia. Producció. Serveis. Turisme. Preus
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