Beginning with the work of Forrest et al, several researchers have developed intrusion detection techniques based on modeling program behaviors in terms of system calls. A weakness of these techniques is that they focus on control flows involving system calls, but not their arguments. This weakness makes them susceptible to several classes of attacks, including attacks on security-critical data, race-condition and symbolic link attacks, and mimicry attacks. To address this weakness, we develop a new approach for learning dataflow behaviors of programs. The novelty in our approach, as compared to previous system-call argument learning techniques, is that it learns temporal properties involving the arguments of different system calls, thus capturing the flow of security-sensitive data through the program. An interesting aspect of our technique is that it can be uniformly layered on top of most existing control-flow models, and can leverage control-flow contexts to significantly increase the precision of dataflows captured by the model. This contrasts with previous system-call argument learning techniques that did not leverage control-flow information, and moreover, were focused on learning statistical properties of individual system call arguments. Through experiments, we show that temporal properties enable detection of many attacks that aren't detected by previous approaches. Moreover, they support formal reasoning about security assurances that can be provided when a program follows its dataflow behavior model, e.g., tar would read only files located within a directory specified as a command-line argument.